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Why Companies Do Not Pay Cash Dividends: The Turkish Experience 
 
Abstract  
This study uses a survey approach to examine the views of corporate managers of non-
dividend-paying firms listed on the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) in order to identify the factors 
leading to the decision not to pay cash dividends in Turkey. Our survey results show that 
cash constraints, growth opportunities, low profitability and earnings, and the cost of raising 
external funds (debt) are the major reasons inducing BIST firms not to pay dividends. 
Additionally, non-dividend-paying firms consider their shareholder preferences when setting 
a policy of paying no cash dividends. Yet, they neither view taxes as an important factor for 
paying no dividends nor perceive that stock repurchases are substitutes for cash dividends. 
Statistical analysis using secondary data of publicly-traded BIST firms reveals whether the 
actual corporate actions are consistent with the managerial views revealed by our survey 
research. These tests show that growth opportunities and debt level have a negative effect 
on the dividend payment decisions of BIST firms. Also, large blockholders and the existence 
of multiple large shareholders reduce the likelihood and intensity of paying a cash dividend 
in the Turkish market. Overall, the evidence suggests that non-dividend-paying companies 
are likely to be smaller in size, relatively younger (in the earlier stage of their life cycle) with 
high-growth opportunities or with a low level of profitability (or even loss) and small 
(negative) earnings. By contrast, highly-profitable, mature and large-size corporations are 
more likely to pay cash dividends. 
JEL Classification: G35 
Keywords: Dividend policy; cash dividends; survey research; Borsa Istanbul; Turkey. 
  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
3 
 
Why Companies Do Not Pay Cash Dividends: The Turkish Experience 
 
1. Introduction  
Why firms pay dividends, also called the dividend puzzle by Black (1976), has long 
been one of the greatest enigmas of corporate finance. Yet, conventional wisdom suggests 
that dividend policy decisions play an important role in overall corporate strategy and firm 
value creation. Today, corporations follow many different dividend payout policies. Some 
firms pursue a stable dividend policy while others follow a residual policy of paying out 
whatever remains after funding desired investments. Still others distribute dividend 
payments as an internal disciplinary tool for reducing agency problems or to signal good 
financial performance. Others pay no or low dividends to avoid or lessen shareholders’ tax 
burden. More mature and profitable companies often maintain higher payout levels, whereas 
their smaller and highly levered counterparts are unwilling to distribute the profit as a cash 
dividend. Alternatively, some corporations recognize the shifts in investor demand and adopt 
dividend polices accordingly. However, others pay no cash dividends. In summary, no single 
or “one-size-fits-all” explanation adequately describes why firms pay dividends.  
Although the dividend literature contains numerous theoretical and empirical studies 
on the dividend puzzle, researchers have generally paid very little attention to why some 
firms consistently pay no cash dividends. Furthermore, in studying dividend policy, they have 
largely relied on economic modelling approaches and have typically attempted to model 
dividend behavior mathematically and relate dividend policy to share-price levels. Without 
obtaining direct evidence from actual policy makers, economic modelling using statistical 
analysis of published financial data can explain only apparent reality but cannot measure 
motivation, which is the primary power behind generating such data. As Frankfurter et al. 
(2002, p. 202) note, “… one cannot understand the motivation and perception of people by 
simply analyzing market data.” According to Chiang et al. (2006), the cardinal thrust of 
academic research must turn toward learning about motivation and on what perceptions this 
motivation is based.  
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In this respect, some researchers use a survey-based approach to provide insights 
into corporate managers’ motivation and perceptions about dividend decisions involving 
different countries – both developed and developing (emerging) markets. Despite the 
increase in the amount of survey research on dividend policy, the extant survey studies have 
mainly investigated the views of financial managers who are responsible for making such 
decisions to enhance our understanding of why corporations pay dividends but survey 
evidence on why companies do not pay cash dividends is limited. To date, Baker (1989) and 
Baker et al. (2012) are the only survey-based studies that focus exclusively on non-dividend-
paying firms, presenting evidence from developed markets, the United States and Canada, 
respectively.  
To the best of our knowledge, no existing survey research directly examines why 
firms pay no cash dividends in an emerging market context. Consequently, the paper’s 
primary purpose is to extend survey-based research into an emerging market and to provide 
important new insights about why firms do not pay cash dividends in such a market. 
Specifically, we focus on Turkey and survey corporate managers of the Borsa Istanbul 
(BIST)-listed firms with a long-standing policy of paying no cash dividends. Given potential 
difficulties associated with using primary data, we supplement our survey findings by 
statistically analyzing accounting and financial data. This triangulation approach helps lessen 
the inherent weaknesses of a single approach. Triangulation is a powerful technique that 
facilitates validation of data through cross verification from two or more sources. In 
particular, it refers to the application and combination of several research methods in the 
study of the same phenomenon. 
As previously noted, Frankfurter et al. (2002) maintain that researchers cannot 
understand the dividend puzzle by analyzing secondary (market) data because such an 
approach cannot directly detect motivations. As Bruner (2002, p. 50) states “The task must 
be to look for patterns of confirmation across approaches and studies much like one sees an 
image in a mosaic of stones.” Baker et al. (2011) indicate that using multiple approaches or 
methodologies to confirm dividend determinants is likely to produce more generalizable 
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findings than relying on a single approach. Accordingly, our study contributes to the dividend 
literature by using a triangulation approach. 
Turkey is one of the most important emerging economies, strategically located 
between Europe and the Middle-East, and a candidate member of the European Union (EU). 
As discussed later, Turkey provides a relevant setting for the study because the ownership 
structures of listed firms are highly concentrated. Turkey has a bank-based financial system 
and differential tax rates exist between dividend income and capital gains among investors. 
These features differ substantially from well-developed markets such as in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Turkish authorities implemented major economic and structural 
reforms in the early 2000s to integrate with world markets. These authorities also made 
major changes in the regulatory framework of cash dividend payment rules by abolishing 
compulsory minimum dividend payout requirements beginning in the 2009. This action gave 
BIST corporate managers the freedom to make their own dividend policy decisions. 
Our study contributes to the dividend policy literature in several ways. First, we 
extend the growing body of behavioral studies that provide “micro” investigations of dividend 
behavior by focusing on how managers of non-dividend-paying companies make dividend 
policy decisions in an emerging market context. Second, we not only report survey-based 
evidence from corporate managers on why their firms pay no cash dividends but also report 
findings from regression analysis about the factors leading to the decision to pay or not to 
pay dividends based on our survey results as well as the related literature. Third, our study 
of non-dividend payers complements studies by Baker et al. (2017) who examine the classic 
question of why companies pay dividends by surveying a sample of dividend-paying BIST-
listed firms. We believe that this research provides the first comprehensive study in an 
emerging market using both survey-based (primary data) and statistical evidence (secondary 
data) from publicly listed non-dividend-paying firms.  
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2. Research Questions in the Turkish Context 
The Turkish stock market, originally called the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), started 
its operations on January 3, 1986. On April 3, 2013, the ISE became the Borsa Istanbul 
(BIST). Turkish authorities imposed heavy compulsory dividend policy rules (known as the 
“first mandatory dividend policy”) on publicly listed firms when the ISE started operations. 
According to these rules, ISE firms had to pay at least 50% of their distributable profit as a 
cash dividend. Adaoglu (2000) and Aivazian et al. (2003a) conducted studies during early 
periods in Turkey that identified current year earnings as the sole determinant of cash 
dividends, as forced by the first dividend rule. These studies also report that the levels of 
current cash dividends directly reflect any volatility in current earnings. Thus, ISE firms did 
not pay cash dividends when their earnings were low or negative due to existing rules. 
The Capital Markets Board (CMB) of Turkey made important changes in the 
regulatory framework of dividend policy rules in early 2000s. Specifically, the CMB employed 
more flexible mandatory dividend policy rules, as compared to the first regulation, and 
eventually decided not to set a minimum payout ratio. As a result, compulsory dividend 
payment requirements ended beginning in the 2009 fiscal year. Consequently, this action 
gave corporate managers the freedom to make their own dividend policy decisions. This 
development also suggests that other scenarios may exist in explaining a Turkish-listed 
firm’s rationale for paying no cash dividends, rather than only its poor financial performance.  
Previous studies show that, unlike the highly diffused ownership settings in the 
Anglo-American capital markets where companies usually rely on arm’s-length contracting 
by uninformed and dispersed outside investors, publicly listed firms in Turkey generally had 
high ownership concentration. Founding families, who usually owned business groups 
affiliated with industrial (businesses and subsidiaries) and financial (banks) companies 
organized under the legal form of a “holding company”, dominated such concentrated 
ownership. Foreign investors, financial institutions, and the state were the other types of 
blockholders in the Turkish market (Glen et al., 1995; Yurtoglu, 2003; Caliskan and Icke, 
2011; Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan, 2016, 2017). Moreover, Turkey had a bank-based financial 
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system where private sector banks characterized the market and were mainly part of bigger 
family-owned holding companies. The popularity of holding company structures led the 
Turkish financial system to operate around large family-controlled business groups with a 
group-owned bank. As a result of this infrastructure, families controlled not only many banks 
belonging to their business groups but also bank lending decisions. Hence, business groups 
used to obtain much of their funds from their own banks (Aivazian et al., 2003b; Ararat and 
Ugur, 2003; Erturk, 2003; IIF, 2005).  
Some contend that cash dividends are a more valuable pre-commitment mechanism 
to reduce agency problems and to signal insider information in market-oriented economies, 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom, where the ownership structure is 
dispersed among small shareholders and the corporate control remains concentrated in the 
hands of managers (Dewenter and Warther, 1998; Aivazian et al., 2003a). Given the nature 
of the Turkish-listed firms’ highly concentrated ownership forms and their characteristics of 
bank-centered financing, especially owner-bank-firm relations, this argument may function 
differently in Turkey. The rationale behind this view is that founding families and their direct 
involvement in the managements of their firms lead to greater supervision and fewer owner-
manager conflicts as well as alleviating information asymmetry. Large shareholders (i.e., 
foreign investors, financial institutions and the state) can act as an alternate governance 
device and monitor managerial activities. Thus, such large shareholders can mitigate the 
free-rider problem of monitoring managers. Also, the presence of both controlling owners 
and strong blockholders might develop close ties, or even coalitions, between owner-
manager and investors, which in turn could lessen the information asymmetries amongst the 
related parties. Hence, these features generally reduce the need for paying cash dividends 
as either an internal disciplinary device or a signaling tool. 
Furthermore, the tax category circumstances and dividend sentiments of these large 
shareholders may not be homogenous or remain unchanged over time. Therefore, their 
dividend preferences can have major implications on dividend decisions of BIST-listed firms. 
Under the current Turkish tax regime, differences exist between the tax rate on capital gains 
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and cash dividends as well as the taxation of dividends among investors. For example, 
capital gains on equities are tax-free for foreign investors but they must pay a 15% 
withholding tax for their cash dividends received on the shares they hold (TCMA, 2016). 
Thus, such investors are likely to prefer capital gains and may force managers to retain cash 
rather than paying dividends in order to avoid the tax burden.  
In another scenario, strong blockholders, especially controlling owners, may seek 
long-run growth potential instead of short-term dividend income. This situation would 
encourage their management to use low cost and easily accessible internal funds for 
expansion. Conventional wisdom suggests that, other things being equal, if a firm exploits 
positive net present value (NPV) projects for investments, the market may view a no cash 
dividends policy favorably (La Porta et al., 2000; Hu and Kumar, 2004) because this policy 
will have a positive effect on earnings growth and profitability. 
Accordingly, we set forth the following major research questions based on these 
unique characteristics of the Turkish market: 
1. What are the most important factors influencing decisions of corporate managers of 
BIST-listed firms to pay no cash dividends?  
2. Do corporate managers of BIST-listed firms consider their shareholders’ preferences 
in setting a no cash dividends policy?  
3. What are the perceptions of corporate managers of BIST-listed firms about the 
relation between a no cash dividends policy and common share prices?  
4. Do corporate managers of BIST-listed firms perceive that paying no cash dividends is 
associated with such factors as signaling, tax rates, concentrated ownership, flotation 
costs, and transaction costs? 
 
3. Sample Description  
Using the Public Disclosure Platform (KAP) (2017) of BIST, we identified 301 
companies listed on the BIST-All Shares Index as of March 15, 2016. We then excluded 
financial sector corporations and utilities because they are governed by different regulations 
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and follow arguably different investment and dividend policies. These criteria result in 216 
industrial (non-financial and non-utility) firms from 14 broad industries of which the most 
common types are industrial goods and services (16.7%), personal and household goods 
(14.8%), construction and materials (13.9%), and food and beverage (10.6%), which 
constitute about 56% of all firms.  
Table 1 illustrates the patterns of cash dividend payments and net earnings of our 
sample of 216 BIST-listed industrial firms between 2009, when the CMB of Turkey decided 
to not impose any compulsory dividend payment requirement, and 2016. The evidence 
shows that the proportion of dividend-paying firms in Turkey increases between 2009 and 
2016. Almost 28% of the sample distributed a cash dividend in 2009, and the percentage of 
dividend payers peaked at 47% in 2015 and stayed around 45% in 2016. We further observe 
that the real aggregate cash dividends and net earnings (after taxes) followed a similar 
increasing pattern. Specifically, cash dividends and net earnings in 2009 were, on average 
TL25 million (where TL refers to the Turkish Lira) and TL55 million, respectively. These 
figures rose to TL65 million and TL101 million in 2015, but decreased to TL55 million and 
TL82 million in 2016. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Regarding the firm-level data of BIST firms, the results reveal that the average 
dividends per share of our sample show an increasing trend from TL0.09 in 2009 to TL0.36 
in 2016, with a slight downward fluctuation in 2014. The average earnings per share of BIST 
industrials, however, dropped to TL0.30 in 2016 from TL0.45 in 2009, with some major 
fluctuations over the entire period. Likewise, the average dividend payout ratio increased 
with some fluctuations to 29% in 2012 from 11% in 2009, and then sharply rose up to 44% in 
2013, followed by a dramatically declining pattern to about 17% at year-end 2016. 
Conversely, the dividend yield level of our sampled firms increased from 1.1% in 2009 to 
2.5% in 2016, with a slight decline in 2014. Overall, the evidence generally suggests an 
increasing pattern in the percentage of dividend-paying firms and a tendency to pay more in 
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terms of both aggregated and per share forms between 2009 and 2016. Yet, some firms 
consistently do not pay cash dividends and are the subject of our study. 
 
4. Survey Analysis 
4.1 Survey Design 
Our survey provides the primary data needed to investigate our research questions in 
the Turkish market. Although modelled after questionnaires by Baker (1989) for the U.S. 
market and Baker et al. (2012) for the Canadian market, our questionnaire incorporates 
some minor modifications to reflect the Turkish environment. Using a similar questionnaire 
permits comparing the views of corporate managers of BIST firms with those reported in the 
two previous studies related to the determinants of paying no cash dividends. The survey 
instrument is available from the authors on request. 
Our questionnaire consists of three sections. The first section contains four closed-
ended questions about the background information of managers and their firms. The second 
section asks respondents to express the importance level of 18 factors in determining their 
firm’s no cash dividend policy (hereafter called F1 through F18), using a five-point scale 
where 0 = none, 1 = low, 2 = moderate, 3 = high, and 4 = very high. To augment the 
information obtained from responses to the 18 factors, we include two open-ended questions 
asking respondents (1) to state whether other factors are important besides those previously 
mentioned, and (2) to indicate the three major reasons their firms do not pay cash dividends. 
The third section comprises 13 questions about various dividend policy issues of the 
responding firms and those of firms in general. Of the 13 questions, 11 statements (hereafter 
called S1 through S11) ask participants to respond by indicating “Yes,” “No” or “Don’t Know”. 
We also offer an executive summary of our findings to all interested respondents.  
 
4.2 Data Collection and Response Rate 
From the initial 216 industrial BIST-listed firms, 89 paid no cash dividends between 
January 2011 and January 2016. The Public Disclosure Platform of Borsa Istanbul (2017) 
was the source for the names, e-mail addresses, and telephone numbers of the financial 
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officers/directors of the 89 non-divided payers. The first mailing of the cover letter and 
questionnaire to the top manager of each of these firms occurred during the first week of 
April 2016, followed by second copy of the survey to non-respondents at the beginning of 
May 2016. Starting in June 2016, we contacted the remaining non-respondents by telephone 
call to give them the option to answer the questionnaire over the telephone. By the end of 
July 2016, we received usable responses from 51 managers (28 by email and 23 by 
telephone) from the 89 BIST-listed non-dividend payers, resulting in a 57.3% response rate. 
The response rate is relatively high compared to rates obtained in similar studies such as 
Baker (1989) (38.9%), Baker et al. (2012) (32.9%), and Baker et al. (2017) (45.2%) that 
targeted dividend-paying firms in Turkey. 
  
4.3 Potential Limitations  
Survey research may be subject to potential limitations. Despite a high response 
rate, non-response bias could still be present. Testing for non-response bias involved the 
common technique of comparing the characteristics of responding (51) and non-responding 
(38) firms on 10 firm characteristics using 2016 data: number of employees, market value, 
total assets, sales, family ownership, foreign ownership, return on assets (ROA), market-to-
book ratio, debt ratio, and current ratio. As Table 2 reveals, the results of the t-tests for 
equality of means show no significant differences between respondent and non-respondent 
firms on each characteristic at any conventional significance level. The results of the 
Wilcoxon test support this finding. Because the firm characteristics of the two groups are 
statistically similar, this finding lessens concern about non-response bias.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Besides non-response bias, survey research methodology may be the source of 
other potential drawbacks. For instance, the respondents could misunderstand the questions 
and so the questionnaire might not elicit the appropriate information sought by researchers, 
or even the respondents might not answer truthfully or carefully. However, we base the 
current survey on several well-known dividend surveys. Given that the survey is confidential 
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and only presents data in summary form, measurement errors are likely to be minimal. In 
this respect, conducting telephone surveys not only increased the response rate and 
reduced potential non-response bias but also showed no evidence that respondents 
answered untruthfully or misunderstood the questions.  
The survey instrument involves a trade-off between the information needed and the 
response rate. The survey design was to limit the length, scope, and types of questions 
asked to increase the response rate for both email and telephone surveys. The telephone 
survey used the same questionnaire but we allowed respondents to elaborate only on open-
ended questions.  
Another potential concern is that responses involve only one manager within each 
firm. Although multiple individuals are typically involved in setting dividend decisions, 
identifying and surveying all participants would be impractical. Finally, the study is limited to 
non-dividend-paying firms and therefore generalizing our findings requires caution.  
4.4 Profile of Respondents and Firms  
 Of the 89 surveys, 51 responding firms represent a broad cross-section of 12 
industries. The most frequently represented industries are industrial goods and services 
(19.6%) and food and beverage (19.6%), followed by personal and household goods 
(17.6%). The each of the remaining industry groups represents less than 10% of the 
responses. However, the distribution of the respondents shows similar frequencies with the 
total sample regarding lines of business. Of the 51 respondents, 76.5% confirm that they are 
actively involved in determining their companies’ dividend policy. The most common titles of 
the respondents are director of finance (52.9%), chief financial officer (CFO) (29.4%), and 
chief executive officer (CEO) (7.8%), whereas the remaining respondents hold positions 
such as director of investor relations, chief accountant, and general manager (finance). 
Hence, survey participants represent top managers who are generally involved in making 
decisions involving dividend policy.  
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Of the responding firms, about 70.6% of the managers state that either the CEOs 
(60.8%) or CFOs (9.8%) are the most influential in developing firm dividend policies; 
whereas 17.6% indicate that the opinions of all directors on the board are equally important 
in making such decisions. According to 11.8% of the respondents, the chairman of their 
company or president of their business groups, who are the main owners and mostly 
members of the founding families, are the sole decision-makers regarding dividends. 
Moreover, most managers (74.5%) expressed that they re-examine their firms’ dividend 
policies annually, compared with 11.8% that reported every 3 to 5 years, 3.9% that said 
every 6 months, 5.9% stated that they reconsider dividend decisions when necessary, 2.0% 
indicated that they will re-examine dividend policy only when the firm becomes profitable, 
and the other 2.0% specified that they will review their payout policies if a regulatory change 
occurs.  
 Finally, the questionnaire asked surveyed managers whether their firms inform 
shareholders that paying no regular cash dividends is a corporate policy. About 90% of the 
respondents answered affirmatively. These respondents pointed out that they use different 
and multiple media to convey such information. For instance, annual and/or quarterly reports 
(94.1%) and companies’ official websites and/or the Public Disclosure Platform of BIST 
(64.7%) are the two most popular methods to inform shareholders, followed by shareholder 
meetings (21.6%), a prospectus (9.8%), and shareholder letters (7.8%). Presentations 
(3.9%) and press releases (3.9%) are the least frequently used ways for this purpose. 
4.5 Factors for Not Paying Cash Dividends  
 To address our first research question, the questionnaire asked respondents to 
identify the most important factors affecting the decision not to pay cash dividends. Table 3 
shows the level of importance given by respondents to 18 potential factors by reporting the 
descriptive statistics (percentages, mean, and standards deviation). It also reports the 
results for each of the 18 factors ranked by their mean score along with their corresponding 
t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean response equals 2 (moderate importance).  
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(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 As Table 3 illustrates, at least half of the responding managers identify eight factors 
(with the positive and statistically significant t-values at the 1% level) as being of high/very 
high importance (F1, F2, F3, F4, F6, F8, F10, and F11). The three most highly ranked 
factors are the availability of cash (F1), the preference to reinvest cash flows instead of 
paying cash dividends (F11), and the level of current earnings (F2) (88.3%, 86.3%, and 
80.4%, respectively). The fourth and fifth highest ranked factors are the anticipated level of 
future earnings (F6) (66.7%) and the availability of profitable investment opportunities (F8) 
(76.4%). Three of the five highest ranked factors for not paying cash dividends relate to cash 
and earnings levels (i.e., the firm’s profitability). This finding implies that poor profitability 
means low levels of earnings and is associated with less availability of cash, or even cash 
flow shortages. Because cash generally serves as the basis for paying dividends, low 
profitability firms and those incurring losses are unwilling to distribute cash dividends. Of the 
five most influential factors for a no cash dividend policy, two involve growth/investment 
opportunities. Companies with strong growth opportunities typically need more funds to 
finance their expansion. Hence they tend to use their internally generated earnings for 
investment projects rather than paying cash dividends.  
Other factors having at least half of the responding managers’ view as important are 
the cost of raising external funds (F4), stage in the firm’s life cycle (F3), and concern about 
maintaining a target capital structure (F10) (66.6%, 60.8%, and 54.9%, respectively). Two of 
these factors relate to a firm’s financing decisions. This evidence suggests that firms prefer 
to retain earnings because using internal cash to finance investments is less expensive and 
less risky than raising external funds. If firms distribute their profits as cash dividends, they 
might have to raise additional debt, which increases default risk. Responding managers are 
sensitive to preserving their target capital structures. They are likely to have alternative uses 
of earnings that they view as more appropriate than paying dividends. This evidence may 
also infer that smaller and younger firms view paying dividends as costly. Paying dividends 
could result in raising costly external equity to finance projects rather than using less 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
15 
 
expensive internally generated funds. Finally, about 55% of the respondents indicate the 
phase of their firm’s life cycle is another important concern leading to a no cash dividend 
policy. Consistent with the maturity (firm life cycle) hypothesis developed by Grullon et al. 
(2002), this finding suggests that firms in their growth stage have many positive NPV 
projects that could benefit from using internally generated funds to fund growth and 
expansion instead of paying dividends.   
To complement the results obtained from the 18 closed-end questions shown in 
Table 3, the questionnaire asked respondents to identify whether other factors exist leading 
to a firm not paying cash dividends. Although about 80% of the respondents answered “No” 
(72.6%) and “Don’t Know” (7.8%), the majority of the remaining 20% of the participating 
managers emphasized their poor financial performance as the major reason for not paying 
dividends. Our telephone surveys provided more insights into this issue. Respondents 
confirmed that incurring losses resulted in insufficient cash to pay dividends. Also, obtaining 
debt to cover their past year deficits prevented them from distributing cash as a dividend 
because they had to repay their debt whenever generating internal funds. Overall, firms do 
not pay cash dividends because they have insufficient cash flows due to their poor financial 
performance, the need to repay debt obtained to cover their deficits and their vulnerable 
condition.  
From a list of eight possible reasons for not paying dividends, our survey asked 
participants to select the three major reasons. As Table 4 shows, the overwhelming reason 
selected is low profitability and earnings (74.5%), followed by the need of funds for growth 
and expansion (60.8%), the preference to limit raising external funds due to costs (45.1%), 
and small excess cash flows (41.2%). These findings are similar to those results reported in 
Table 3, especially regarding the most important factors for a no cash dividend policy. Of the 
eight possible reasons, two other reasons cited by more than 10% of the respondents are 
investor preferences (19.6%) and contractual constrains such as debt covenants (13.7%). 
However, the reasons of industry practice and the preference to distribute cash using stock 
repurchases receive the lowest supports from the managers of non-dividend-paying firms 
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(5.9% and 2.0%, respectively). Unlike several studies suggesting that share repurchases 
may substitute cash dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008; Gaspar et al., 
2013), our evidence corroborates the view that repurchases are not perfect substitutes for 
cash dividends in the Turkish market.  
Besides these eight reasons, our survey offers an “Other” option for managers who 
may want to state other major reasons for not paying dividends, rather than the given eight 
reasons. A total of 37.3% of the respondents opted for “Other” and indicated reasons such 
as losses from current and past years, repaying debt and/or debt level, instability of financial 
condition, smaller business size, and earlier stages in their life cycle, which are also 
consistent with our previous results.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
Overall, in response to the first research question, our survey evidence clearly shows 
that the main reasons for BIST-listed firms not paying cash dividends involve cash 
constraints, availability of profitable investment opportunities, poor profitability and earnings, 
and cost of raising external funds (debt). These findings suggest that non-dividend-paying 
BIST firms are likely to be smaller in size, relatively younger (in the earlier stage of their life 
cycle) with high-growth opportunities, or with a low level of profitability (or even loss) and 
small (negative) earnings. Finally, these major factors leading to a no cash dividend policy 
appear very similar (in fact, almost identical) to those reported in survey studies investigating 
non-dividend-paying firms by Baker (1989) in the United States and Baker et al. (2012) in 
Canada. Similar results occur despite the differing characteristics of both these markets and 
firms operating in them such as adequate disclosure, laws and regulations, institutional 
environment, corporate governance practices and ownership structures, political, social and 
financial stability. 
 
4.6 Shareholder Preferences  
Table 4 reveals that about one-fifth of the respondents (19.6%) indicate that one of 
three most important reasons for their firms paying no dividends is investor preferences. 
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However, the questionnaire asked three more direct questions in order to find out how 
responsive BIST corporate managers are to shareholders’ preferences while choosing not to 
pay cash dividends. As Panel A in Table 5 shows, the majority of participating managers 
(60.8%) perceive that their shareholders generally prefer a no dividend policy (S1). Further, 
more than half of the respondents (54.9%) think that shareholders in their firms prefer capital 
gains to dividends (S2). Finally, when asked whether their firms are responsive to 
shareholders’ dividend preferences (S3), 68.6% of the respondents answered affirmatively. 
Hence, setting a low or no cash dividend policy would be consistent with this perception.  
The questionnaire also asked participants if they wanted to make additional remarks 
about their firm’s policy of paying no regular cash dividends. About 23.5% of them stated 
that corporate decisions set by a family-controlled business group are also crucial for their 
firm’s no cash dividend policy. In general, our survey findings, in response to the second 
research question, show some evidence that shareholders’ preferences affect the decision 
of BIST corporate managers to pay no dividends. 
With this finding in mind, the evidence does not directly address several concerns. 
One concern is whether BIST firms do not pay cash dividends because their existing 
shareholders favor capital gains. Another concern is whether BIST firms attract such 
investors, who deliberately invest in non-dividend-paying stocks, after they already decided 
not to pay dividends. These issues are beyond the scope of our paper but could be a subject 
of future studies. Furthermore, our finding is also in line with Baker et al.’s (2017) survey 
evidence, which reports around 90% of the participating corporate managers of BIST-listed 
dividend-paying firms agree that they should be responsive to the dividend preferences of 
their shareholders. Taken together, the evidence from both studies indicates that a role 
exists for catering effects or market sentiment on corporate dividend decisions in the Turkish 
market. Again, this is a promising avenue of future research. 
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4.7 No Cash Dividends Policy and Stock Price  
To investigate the third research questions, the questionnaire asked two questions 
(S4 and S5 as reported in Panel A of Table 5). When asked whether respondents believe 
“paying no dividends positively affects the price of their firm’s common stock (S4),” with 
23.5% answering “Yes,” 58.8% indicating “No,” and the remaining 17.7% responding “Don’t 
Know.” These results suggest a lack of consensus among managers concerning the relation 
between a no cash dividends policy and stock prices. The questionnaire also asked whether 
responding managers think that their “firm’s stock price would increase upon announcing a 
cash dividend (S5)”, with 39.2% opting for “Yes,” 41.2% responding “No,” and 19.6% 
answering “Don’t Know.” This distribution of responses also reveals mixed results. Overall, 
these findings provide inconclusive evidence. Thus, accurately identifying non-dividend-
paying BIST corporate managers’ opinions about the relation between paying a no cash 
dividend, or even distributing dividends, and stock prices was not possible. In contrast, the 
survey findings reported by Baker et al. (2017) on dividend-paying BIST firms indicate that 
their respondents expressed relatively strong agreement with the notion that dividend policy 
affects a firm’s stock price, hence its market value. 
 (Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
4.8 Signaling, Tax, Concentrated Ownership, Flotation, and Transaction Costs Effects 
The results in Panel B in Table 5 relate to our fourth research question. The panel 
illustrates managers’ responses to five statements (S7 through S11) about various factors 
that might influence a firm in general to pay no cash dividends. The survey results show that 
non-dividend-paying BIST managers’ views on the issue of the potential signaling effect of a 
firm’s dividend policy are inconclusive. Asking whether responding managers believe “the 
firm having little need to signal its immediate prospects by paying dividends” (S9) yields 
mixed responses with 37.3% responding “Yes,” 39.2% answering “No,” and 23.5% stating 
“Don’t Know.” In fact, when asked another signaling question related to their firm’s no cash 
dividends policy, which is whether they believe “paying no dividends serves as a message 
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from management about the future prospects of their firm” (S6 in Panel A), the responses 
are fairly evenly divided with 43.1% “Yes” responses and 41.2% “No” responses. The results 
further reveal that BIST corporate managers do not perceive taxes as a major reason for a 
firm not paying dividends. Only 23.5% of the respondents believed that a firm would not 
distribute a cash dividend if “the majority of the firm’s owners have high marginal tax rates,” 
(S7) but almost half of the respondents (47.1%) disagreed with this statement. This 
response is also in line with our previous findings because 43.2% of the managers gave 
“None” to “Low” importance to characteristics of shareholders such as their tax 
circumstances (F12 in Table 3), and 31.4% of them ranked this factor as “Moderate.” 
Overall, these results are consistent with Baker et al. (2017) who report little or no support 
for tax-related explanations from dividend-paying BIST managers, although differences exist 
between the tax rate on capital gains and cash dividends as well as in the taxation of 
dividends among investors in Turkey. Unlike our finding about the signaling effect, Baker et 
al. (2017) find that corporate managers of dividend-paying BIST firms express strong 
support for signaling theory. 
Moreover, respondents’ opinions on the influence of high concentration of ownership 
among insiders such as family members (S8) on the decision not to pay dividends are 
mixed, with 41.2% selecting “Yes” and 43.1% answering “No.” Similar results occurred when 
asking respondents whether a firm would not pay a cash dividend if “the majority of the 
owners face high transaction costs of selling their stocks (S11),” with 31.4% indicating “Yes,” 
33.3% responding “No,” and 35.3% answering “Don’t Know.” Finally, the overwhelming 
majority of the respondents (82.4%) show strong agreement with the statement that a firm 
would not distribute dividends if it faces high flotation costs of raising new external capital 
(S10). This evidence supports our previous finding that the cost of raising external funds 
(debt) is one of the main reasons inducing BIST firms not to pay cash dividends. 
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5. Development of Research Hypotheses  
So far, by providing direct evidence from respondents, the findings rely on survey 
data to measure the perceptions of managers of non-dividend-paying BIST-listed firms about 
their rationale for not paying cash dividends. However, as Dhanani (2005) points out, 
surveys measure perceptions and not necessarily corporate actions. Given this potential 
drawback associated with using primary data, our survey findings are supplemented by 
using secondary (published) data (i.e., accounting, financial, and ownership structure 
information) of publicly-traded BIST firms in order to identify whether the actual corporate 
actions are in line with the managerial views revealed by our survey research. Accordingly, 
we advance the following research hypotheses based on the previous survey results about 
no cash dividends policy, as well as considering the related dividend literature, in the Turkish 
market.  
First, our survey results show that the availability of cash, level of current earnings, 
and anticipated level of future earnings are among the most important determinants inducing 
BIST-listed firms to pay no dividends. Given these factors relate to cash and earnings levels, 
this situation infers that poor profitability and even incurring losses influence BIST managers 
to set a no cash dividends policy. The rationale for this view is that low profitability means 
low earnings and is associated with less availability of cash, or even cash flow shortages. 
The dividend policy literature suggests that profitability is the main financial factor in 
determining dividend policy because dividends are the distributions of a firm’s profit to its 
shareholders. Empirical studies such as Fama and French (2001), Aivazian et al. (2003b), 
and Ferris et al. (2006) generally report a positive relation between profitability and dividend 
payments.  
For instance, signaling theory asserts that highly profitable firms are more likely to 
pay dividends to convey their better financial position and tend to distribute larger amounts 
of cash dividends as a good (credible) signal to the market. By contrast, their less or non-
profitable counterparts cannot mimic such dividend payment behavior (Bhattacharya, 1979; 
Miller and Rock, 1985; John and Williams, 1985). As previously stated, beginning in fiscal 
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year 2009, the CMB of Turkey abolished mandatory minimum dividend payment 
requirements and allowed managers to reflect their own judgments when setting dividend 
policies. Based on the above discussion and considering this important development, we 
expect managers of profitable BIST firms to use cash dividends as a signaling tool to show 
their favorable insider information to outside investors.   
H1: A positive association exists between profitability and dividend payment 
decisions of BIST-listed firms.  
Our survey evidence also reveals other major influential factors for a no cash 
dividend policy in the Turkish market. These factors include the availability of profitable 
investment opportunities and thus preference to reinvest cash instead of paying dividends, 
and a firm’s financing decisions, such as the cost of raising external finance (debt) and the 
concern about maintaining a target capital structure. These findings are consistent with the 
extant literature suggesting that strong growth (investment) opportunities reduce both the 
probability and magnitude of dividend payments. High-growth firms need more funds to 
finance their expansion and hence typically tend to use available cash for investments 
projects instead of distributing them as a cash dividend (Rozeff, 1982; Holder et al., 1998; 
Fama and French, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2004a, 200b; Ferris et al., 2006). This negative 
correlation is supported by the pecking order theory developed by Myers (1984) and Myers 
and Majluf (1984), which contends that firms with high growth opportunities use their 
internally generated earnings first to finance those investments. If the investment requires 
more than the available cash, they will then use debt and only raise equity capital as a last 
resort. Hence, high-growth firms should pay out low or no dividends. Similarly, previous 
studies commonly report an inverse relation between external financing (debt) and dividend 
policy. From the transaction cost theory perspective, debt leads to financial charges and 
fixed costs that firms have to repay, and the dependency on high degrees of external 
financing increases the risk of a firm’s stock. Thus, highly levered firms often pay no or low 
dividends because they tend to retain their internal funds to pay their obligations and lower 
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external financing costs, rather than paying the cash to shareholders (Rozeff, 1982; Miller 
and Rock, 1985; Manos, 2002). 
The Turkish capital markets underwent major economic and structural reforms in the 
early 2000s. One of the most important developments was that the CMB of Turkey 
implemented the Banking Sector Restructuring Program in May 2001 for restructuring public 
banks, rehabilitating the private banking system, and strengthening surveillance and 
supervision to increase efficiency in the sector. The CMB further introduced Regulation on 
Establishment and Operations of Banks in July 2001 to apply related enforcements to 
minimize credit risk concentration for a single business group and to prevent insider lending 
as a source of financing by considering direct and connected loans (IIF, 2005; BRSA, 2010). 
Given that most of the business group companies used to obtain much of their funds from 
their own banks in early periods, these amendments in banking sector regulations led BIST 
firms to seek more transparent financing in the capital markets. Accordingly, we expect that 
BIST firms find external funds that now provided from arm’s-length parties more costly and 
thus those firms with high growth and/or more debt are less likely to pay cash dividends. 
Thus, we set forth the following two hypothesizes.  
H2: A negative association exists between growth and dividend payment decisions of 
BIST-listed firms. 
H3: A negative association exists between debt and dividend payment decisions of 
BIST-listed firms.  
 Responding managers of non-dividend-paying BIST firms further indicate that the 
earlier stage in their firm life cycle and smaller business size also lead them to choose not to 
pay cash dividends. In the same vein, the maturity (firm life cycle) hypothesis, proposed by 
Grullon et al. (2002), attempts to link firm age with dividend policy. This explanation suggests 
that firms in the growth stage typically have many positive NPV projects and thus require 
funds to finance fast growth and expansion, which in turn results in paying no dividends. 
However, as firms transit from growth to a more mature phase, they are more likely to pay 
higher dividends. This change is because their investment opportunities and growth rates 
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become slower or even decline, and they start generating larger amounts of free cash flow. 
DeAngelo et al. (2006) also support this positive relation between firm maturity and dividend 
payments.  
Likewise, firm size is another important characteristic that appears to positively 
influence dividends in the related literature. Evidence shows that large firms are generally 
mature organizations with a steady earnings pattern that enables them to preserve a good 
level of funds, whereas small firms usually experience more volatile cash flows (Fama and 
French, 2001; Grullon et al., 2002). Larger firms have easier access to capital markets and 
can raise external financing at lower costs as compared to smaller firms, which reduces their 
dependence on internally generated earnings (Farinha, 2003; Ferris et al., 2006). Given the 
lower transaction costs and less reliance on internal funds, this evidence suggests that 
large-size firms are more likely to pay dividends and can afford to distribute higher cash 
dividends than their smaller counterparts.  
The Turkish stock exchange is a comparatively young stock market whose history 
only dates back to 1986. Yet, companies trading on the BIST vary from old and well-
established family-controlled business group companies whose roots trace to the 1920s to 
large holding companies generally founded in the 1970s (Bugra, 1994; Adaoglu, 2000; 
Yurtoglu, 2003) or even relatively young and growing firms that incorporated in the 2000s. 
We infer that the BIST corporation’s life cycles and firm sizes differ dramatically from one 
another, which should affect how their managers make dividend policy decisions. Thus, we 
set forth the following hypotheses:  
H4: A positive association exists between firm age and dividend payment decisions 
of BIST-listed firms.  
H5: A positive association exists between firm size and dividend payment decisions 
of BIST-listed firms.  
 Our survey results also show some evidence that shareholder preferences also play 
a role in encouraging BIST corporate managers to set a no cash dividends policy. 
Considering highly concentrated ownership structures of BIST firms that are dominated by 
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large shareholders, especially families followed by foreign investors, domestic corporations, 
and the state, respondent managers tend to be responsive to the non-dividend preferences 
of their controlling blockholders. In fact, a broadly disputed notion is that dividend payments 
may be a useful pre-commitment internal device to alleviate agency problems in a widely-
held firm, where the ownership is dispersed among small shareholders but the corporate 
control remains concentrated in the hand of professional managers. Cash dividends lessen 
the free cash from the managers’ control that they might spend for unprofitable investments 
or even misuse for their own consumption and also force managers to enter the external 
capital markets for additional funding. This situation increases the screening and monitoring 
by the market (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984). However, this 
situation may not be the case in a market such as Turkey where publicly listed firms have 
concentrated ownership structures.  
Prior studies indicate that large shareholders have the incentives and ability to act as 
an effective monitoring mechanism on management. Therefore, the existence of such large 
shareholders can mitigate the free-rider problem of monitoring managers, which reduces 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Especially, founding families and their direct 
involvement in the managements of their firms lead to greater supervision and few owner-
manager agency conflicts (Fama and Jensen, 1983; La Porta et al., 1999; Setia-Atmaja et 
al., 2009). Hence, the nature of heavily concentrated ownership structures of BIST-listed 
firms minimizes the traditional agency cost problems (the principal-agent conflict) and thus 
generally reduces the need for paying cash dividends as an internal disciplinary device on 
corporate managers. In a recent study, Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016) find that both family 
and other large non-family blockholders (i.e., foreign investors, domestic financial 
institutions, and the state) have a negative impact on dividend policy in the Turkish market. 
Our survey findings and the above discussion lead to the following hypothesize that:  
H6: A negative association exists between ownership concentration and dividend 
payment decisions of BIST-listed firms. 
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6. Statistical Analysis 
 The statistical analysis focuses on our initially selected sample of 216 unique 
industrial BIST-listed firms from 14 broad industries between 2009 and 2016. Firms consist 
of two categories: 89 non-dividend-paying firms and 127 dividend-paying firms that paid a 
cash dividend at least once from January 2011 to January 2016. We obtained the data on 
accounting and financial variables from the S&P Capital IQ database and compiled the 
information on firm ownership and incorporation dates from the annual reports published in 
the Public Disclosure (KAP) of the BIST and firms’ official websites. 
6.1 Univariate Tests  
To further examine the differentiating firm characteristics of non-dividend-paying and 
dividend-paying BIST-listed firms between 2009 and 2016, we use univariate analysis. We 
use a standard t-test of equality of means (without assuming equality of variance) and, for 
robustness, also employ non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test, in order to identify whether 
the two sub-groups are similar or significantly different on each characteristic. Table 6 
reports the results. We observe that compared with non-dividend payers, dividend-paying 
firms (1) are larger in size (significantly higher total sales, total assets, and market value) 
and more mature (significantly higher firm age); (2) have better profitability and cash 
reserves (significantly higher net earnings, cash availability, and return on assets); and (3) 
have fewer growth opportunities (significantly lower market-to-book ratio) and lower debt 
levels (significantly lower total debt-to-total assets ratio). These findings are consistent with 
our survey evidence that non-dividend-paying BIST firms appear to be smaller in size and 
relatively younger (in the earlier stage of their life cycle) with high-growth opportunities, low 
debt ratios, and low levels of profitability. These differentiating characteristics between 
dividend payers and non-dividend payers are also in line with such studies as Fama and 
French (2001), Grullon et al. (2002), Aivazian et al. (2003b), Ferris et al. (2006), and 
DeAngelo et al. (2006). Regarding ownership structure variables, Table 6 shows that both 
dividend-paying and non-paying BIST firms have high family concentrations, but such 
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concentration is even higher for non-dividend payers. Foreign investors are the second 
largest blockholders for both sub-groups and they hold, on average, higher percentages of 
shares in non-dividend-paying firms, whereas domestic (national) investors own higher 
fractions of total equity in dividend-paying BIST firms. Moreover, state ownership shows very 
little shareholdings in dividend-paying firms but no shares in non-paying firms. Lastly, 
minority (small) investors, who held less than the 5% threshold level, have a higher mean 
percentage of shares in non-dividend-paying BIST firms as compared to their dividend-
paying counterparts.  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
6.2 Research Design, Model, and Variables  
To test our research hypotheses (H1 through H6) based on the association between 
selected firm characteristics and dividend payment decisions of BIST-listed firms, we design 
a model that helps determine the effects of these characteristics on the likelihood of paying a 
cash dividend by following Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016, 2017). Specifically, we estimate 
a logit model because while making their dividend policy decisions firms have two options ‒ 
to pay or not to pay dividends. Thus, a logit regression model is an appropriate econometric 
technique for estimating a binary variable (0/1). Then, we define a set of explanatory 
variables, which are based on the most common forms used in the related literature, 
proxying for the six research hypothesis. Given that large shareholders constitute a heavy 
concentration of BIST firms, we further introduce several interaction terms between 
ownership structure variables in the model to provide further insight on the moderating 
effects of large owners on dividend payment decisions. Because our research sample is 
drawn from 14 different industries and covers the relatively long time period between 2009 
and 2016, we attempt to control for the industry-specific effects and unobserved time-varying 
factors by adding industry and year dummies, respectively, into our model. Finally, we also 
consider the issue of endogeneity. Specifically, we use one-year lagged values of each of 
the test variables in the model to ensure that firm characteristics are predetermined with 
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respect to the dividend payment decision in order to alleviate endogeneity concerns. We 
formulate the corresponding logit model (Model 1) as follows:  
DPAY
i,t  
=  α
0 
+ α
1
ROA
i,t-1 
+ α
2
GROW
i,t-1 
+ α
3
DEBT
i,t-1 
+ α
4
AGE
i,t-1 
+ α
5
SIZE
i,t-1 
+ α
6
FMLY
i,t-1 
+ 
α
7
FRGN
i,t-1 
+ α
8
DMSTC
i,t-1 
+ α
9
(FMLY
i,t-1 
x FRGN
i,t-1
) + α
10
(FMLY
i,t-1 
x DMSTC
i,t-1
) + 
α
11
(FRGN
i,t-1 
x DMSTC
i,t-1
) + ∑  𝑁𝑗=1 αjINDUSTRYj,i,t  +  ∑  
𝑇
𝑡=1 αtYEARi,t  +  ε,         (1)              
                       0  if   DPAY
i,t 
 = 0, 
DPAY
i,t  =    
                      1  if   DPAY
i,t 
 > 0, 
                         
where DPAY is the probability of paying a cash dividend (dependent variable), which is a 
binary code (0/1) that equals 1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise. The explanatory 
(test) variables are as follows: ROA is the return on assets ratio (profitability); GROW is the 
market-to-book ratio (growth/investment opportunities); DEBT is the fraction of total debt to 
total assets (debt ratio); the AGE is the natural logarithm of the total number of years since 
the firm’s incorporation date (firm age); SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
capitalization (firm size); FMLY is the fraction of total shares of the firm owned by families 
(family ownership); FRGN is the percentage of total shares of the firm held by foreign 
investors (foreign ownership); DMSTC is the proportion of total shares owned by Turkish 
investors (domestic ownership); and (FMLY x FRGN), (FMLY x DMSTC), and (FRGN x 
DMSTC) are the individual interaction terms between family and foreign ownerships, family 
and domestic ownerships, and foreign and domestic ownerships, respectively. Regarding 
the control variables, INDUSTRY is a vector of dummy variables representing 14 different 
industry classifications and YEAR denotes yearly dummies for the years between 2009 and 
2016, which take a value of 1 for the particular year and 0 otherwise. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
Panel A in Table 7 presents descriptive statistics for our research variables that are 
collected from a panel dataset (unbalanced) of 216 unique industrial BIST-listed firms 
including both dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms with 1,679 firm-year 
observations between 2009 and 2016. As observed, the mean DPAY (0.406) indicates that 
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BIST firms in our sample paid cash dividends in almost 41% of the total observations. 
Moreover, the average DEBT and ROA values reveal that firms had about 22.3% debt 
financing in their capital structures and had around a 3.7% of return on their total assets 
invested over the period. On average, BIST firms exhibited good prospects of growth 
opportunities as GROW shows a mean market-to-book ratio of 1.521, which is higher than 
unity, between 2009 and 2016. Considering corporate ownerships of all firms in our sample 
for this period, Turkish families own about 40% of the total shareholdings, whereas foreign 
and domestic investors hold around 12.2% and 8.4%, respectively, of the outstanding shares 
of the BIST-listed firms.  
Panel B in Table 7 reports the results of Pearson’s correlation and Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) values for the independent variables. The results illustrate significant 
correlations amongst the research variables. Nevertheless, no high correlation exists 
between any two of them, although a few variables are moderately correlated. For example, 
the highest Pearson’s correlation figures (i.e., ROA-DEBT, FMLY-FRGN and FMLY-DMSTC) 
range from 40% to 45%. We also calculate the VIF and tolerance (measured as 1/VIF) 
statistics in order to directly check the issue of multicollinearity. As a rule of thumb, a VIF 
greater than 10 and a tolerance value lower than 0.1 detect multicollinearity. Given that none 
of the VIFs exceeds 10 and none of the tolerance values are smaller than 0.1, our results 
suggest no multicollinearity problem exists between the independent variables. 
6.3 Multivariate Tests 
 We compute our logit model (Model 1) to determine how the characteristics of BIST 
firms affect their decisions to pay or not to pay a cash dividend by applying pooled logit and 
random effects (panel) logit regressions estimates. We also calculate the marginal effects 
(economic significance) of the independent variables to provide further interpretations in 
addition to the coefficient estimates (statistical significance). The marginal effects indicate 
the marginal impact of each of the independent variables on the dependent variable at the 
mean values of other independent variables. Accordingly, Table 8 presents the results of the 
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pooled and random effects logit estimations on the probability of firms paying cash dividends 
in the Turkish market.  
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
The results show that when Model 1 is estimated by the pooled logit regression, it is 
overall statistically significant at the 1% level, as evidenced by the Wald χ2 test. The Pseudo 
R2 value 34.58% suggests a good indication as to the prediction power of the model. When 
using the random effects (panel) regression, the overall significance of the model is also 
highly significant at the 1% level, as reported by Wald χ2 test. In this case, we look at the 
likelihood-ratio test, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that the panel-
level variance component (ρ) value differs considerably from zero (0.5983). This finding 
suggests that the random effects logit estimates are more favorable than the pooled logit 
estimates in predicting the associations between firm characteristics and dividend payment 
decisions of the BIST-listed firms. Thus, we report our findings based on the random effects 
estimates, although we obtain very similar results using the pooled logit regression for the 
model.  
The random effects logit estimates in Table 8 reveal a strong positive association 
between profitability (ROA) and the probability of paying a cash dividend. The coefficient on 
ROA (z = 4.30, p < 0.01) is positive and statistically significant. The marginal effect of this 
variable shows, all else being equal, that a 10 percentage point increase in ROA will 
increase the likelihood of paying dividends by about 11%. The evidence of this positive 
association between profitability and dividend payments is consistent with the extant studies 
such as Fama and French (2001), Aivazian et al. (2003b), and Ferris et al. (2006), 
suggesting that high profitability BIST firms are more likely to distribute dividends. This 
finding is also in accordance with our survey evidence, which indicates that poor profitability 
induces BIST managers not to pay a cash dividend. On the other hand, the logit estimates 
report a solid negative effect of growth/investment opportunities (GROW) on corporate 
dividend decisions, as its coefficient is negative and statistically significant (z = −1.99, p < 
0.05). The marginal effect of GROW shows that the probability of paying a cash dividend will 
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decline by about 1.5% for an average firm, corresponding to a 10 percentage point increase 
in growth opportunities. This result is consistent with our survey finding that the availability of 
positive NPV investment projects is one of the main factors for a no cash dividends policy in 
the Turkish market. It also indicates that strong growth reduces the likelihood of paying 
dividends, consistent with such studies as Rozeff (1982), Myers and Majluf (1984), and 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b). Because high-growth BIST firms need more funds to 
finance their expansion, they tend to use free cash for investments instead of paying it out as 
a cash dividend to shareholders. 
Similarly, the results report another negative association, which is between debt 
(external financing) and dividend payment choices. The DEBT coefficient is highly significant 
and negative (z = −3.64, p < 0.01) and the marginal effect of the variable suggests, all else 
being equal, that a 10 percentage point increase in debt will decrease the probability of 
paying cash dividends by around 5.3%. This inverse correlation is consistent with our survey 
evidence and prior research such as Rozeff (1982), Miller and Rock (1985), and Manos 
(2002). This finding indicates that highly levered BIST firms are likely to maintain their 
earnings to pay their obligations and lower external financing costs, which in turn leads them 
to pay none or low dividends. Furthermore, we observe that firm age (AGE) and firm size 
(SIZE) positively influence the likelihood of paying a cash dividend of BIST-listed firms 
because the coefficients on AGE (z = 1.76, p < 0.10) and SIZE (z = 8.49, p < 0.01) are both 
positive and statistically significant. The marginal effects of these variables show that a 10 
percentage point increase in AGE and SIZE will roughly result in a 0.4% and 1.9% increase 
in the likelihood of paying dividends, respectively. These findings are consistent with our 
survey evidence. Specifically, corporate managers of non-dividend-paying BIST firms 
express that the earlier stage in their firm life cycle and smaller business size also lead them 
to not pay cash dividends. Accordingly, our statistical results indicate that mature and large-
size BIST firms are more likely to pay cash dividends, consistent with Fama and French 
(2001), Grullon et al. (2002), DeAngelo et al. (2006), and Ferris et al. (2006). This evidence 
might mean that such firms can sustain stable funds and have easier access to capital 
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markets and hence be less dependent on retained earnings, which enable them to distribute 
cash dividends. 
The random effects logit estimates in Table 8 further display that both family 
ownership (FMLY) and foreign ownership (FRGN) have a negative impact on the dividend 
payment decisions of BIST firms (z = −2.10, p < 0.05 for FMLY and z = −3.63, p < 0.01 for 
FRGN). The marginal effects of these variables indicate that the probability of paying a cash 
dividend will drop by around 2.0% and 3.6% for an average BIST firm, corresponding to a 10 
percentage point increase in family ownership and foreign stockholdings, respectively. 
However, we find that domestic ownership (DMSTC) alone has no significant influence on 
such decisions.  
As previously mentioned, we add three interaction terms between our ownership 
variables to further examine the effect of the existence of multiple large shareholders on 
dividend payment decisions. The results show that the estimated coefficients on all three 
interaction terms are negative and statistically significant (z = −2.67, p < 0.01 for (FMLY x 
FRGN), z = −2.44, p < 0.05 for (FMLY x DMSTC), and z = −1.77, p < 0.10 for (FRGN x 
DMSTC)). The marginal effects of the interaction terms report, other things being equal, that 
the likelihood of paying dividends will decrease by about 0.26%, 0.18%, and 0.10%, 
corresponding to a 10 percentage point increase in the interactions between family and 
foreign ownerships (FMLY x FRGN), family and domestic ownerships (FMLY x DMSTC), 
and foreign and domestic ownerships (FRGN x DMSTC). Although our survey results 
indicate some evidence that shareholder preferences play a role in encouraging BIST 
managers not to pay cash dividends, our multivariate analysis reveals strong evidence that 
large shareholders have a negative influence on dividend policies of BIST-listed firms. 
Specifically, higher family and foreign ownerships lead to no or lower dividend payments in 
Turkey, consistent with Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016). Additionally, the negative effects of 
all the interaction term variables suggest that the presence of multiple blockholders or higher 
ownership concentration also reduces the probability of paying a cash dividend. 
Consequently, this finding supports the notion that large owners can mitigate the free-rider 
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problem of monitoring managers. Additionally, the nature of heavily concentrated ownership 
structures lessens the need for paying cash dividends as an internal disciplinary device 
(Grossman and Hart, 1980; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; La Porta et 
al., 1999; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Hence, high ownership concentration has a negative 
impact on dividend payment decisions of industrial firms traded in the BIST.  
We perform additional tests to check the robustness of our main findings. 
Specifically, we attempt to find out whether the above results also hold for the intensity (and 
not only the probability) of paying cash dividends. Hence, we employ two substitute dividend 
policy measures (i.e., two alternative dependent variables): (1) the dividend payout ratio, 
which is an accounting measure that is calculated as dividends per share to earnings per 
share, and (2) dividend yield, which is a market measure that is calculated as dividends per 
share to price per share. In this respect, a firm’s dividend payout ratio or dividend yield will 
never be negative (it is left censored at zero) and has two outcomes ‒ either zero (a discrete 
number), if the firm does not pay dividends, or a positive value (continuous numbers), in 
which case the firm pays dividends. Thus, we use the Tobit regression technique for 
estimating such dependent variables that are left censored at zero and contain a mixture of 
continuous and discrete values. Accordingly, Table 9 illustrates the results of the pooled and 
random effects Tobit estimations on the dividend payout ratio (denoted as DPOUT) by Model 
2 and on the dividend yield (denoted as DYIELD) by Model 3 in the Turkish market. As Table 
shows, the Tobit coefficients and marginal effects on dividend payout ratio and dividend yield 
are in line with the logit estimates reported in Table 8. These results are consistent because 
the independent variables have the same directional signs and exhibit similar statistical 
significance behavior. Overall, this evidence confirms the robustness of our main findings 
and therefore provides support for H1 to H6.  
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
We examine the trend in the propensity to pay cash dividends in the Turkish market 
between 2009, when the CMB of Turkey decided not to determine any mandatory dividend 
payment requirement, and 2016. In general, our results show an increasing pattern in the 
percentage of dividend-paying firms and a tendency to pay more in terms of both aggregated 
and per share forms over this period. Because some firms consistently do not distribute cash 
dividends, we survey corporate managers of the BIST-listed firms with a long standing policy 
of paying no cash dividends to gain insights about why some companies do not pay 
dividends. This approach differs from the extant survey studies that mainly investigate why 
corporations pay dividends. Accordingly, the findings of our survey of non-dividend-paying 
managers of BIST firms lead to several important conclusions.  
First, our survey results reveal that major reasons behind BIST-listed firms’ decision 
not to pay dividends are cash constraints, availability of profitable investment opportunities, 
poor profitability and earnings, and cost of raising external funds. The survey results 
generally suggest that non-dividend-paying BIST companies are likely to be smaller in size, 
relatively younger (in the earlier stage of their life cycle) with high-growth opportunities, or 
with a low level of profitability (or even loss) and small (negative) earnings. Second, the 
findings show some evidence that Turkish firms consider their shareholders’ preferences in 
setting a no cash dividends policy. Third, we find that non-dividend-paying BIST managers 
do not perceive taxes as an important reason for paying no dividends, although differences 
exist between the tax rate on capital gains and cash dividends as well as in the taxation of 
dividends among investors in Turkey. Fourth, our survey findings indicate strong agreement 
to that a firm would not distribute dividends if it faces high flotation costs of raising new 
external capital. Yet, the results are inconclusive about how managers view the relation 
between paying a no cash dividend, and even distributing dividends, and stock prices, and 
the potential signaling role of dividend policy. Finally, contrary to the argument that firms use 
share repurchases as substitutes for cash dividends, managers of non-dividend-paying BIST 
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firms rank the preferences to distribute cash using stock repurchases instead of dividends as 
the lowest among 18 factors that may lead to pay no dividends.  
Furthermore, we supplement our survey findings by statistical analysis using 
secondary (published) data of publicly-traded BIST firms in order to determine whether 
actual corporate actions are consistent with the managerial views revealed by our survey 
research. The use of a triangulation approach sets our dividend study apart from most 
others. In this respect, the results of our univariate tests show that, compared to dividend 
payers, non-dividend-paying BIST firms are smaller in size and relatively younger (in the 
earlier stage of their life cycle), have lower profitability and cash reserves, and experience 
higher growth opportunities and debt ratios. These differentiating characteristics are 
consistent with our survey evidence as well as previous studies in the literature. The 
univariate results also indicate that large shareholders, such as families, foreign, and 
domestic (national) investors, highly dominate both dividend-paying and non-paying BIST-
listed firms but ownership concentration is even higher for non-payers. 
The results of our multivariate analysis also provide several conclusions that are 
consistent with both our survey findings and the extant dividend policy literature. First, our 
results detect a negative relation between growth and dividend payments. This finding 
suggests that the availability of positive NPV investment projects is an important factor for a 
no cash dividends policy. The reason is because high-growth BIST firms appear to maintain 
corporate earnings to fund their investments instead of paying dividends. Second, the 
evidence from our regression tests shows that debt level has an inverse impact on dividend 
policy. This finding suggests that high-levered BIST firms are likely to choose to pay no or 
low dividends and use free cash to pay their obligations occurred from external financing or 
to cover their deficits from past years. Third, the results reveal that large blockholders, 
particularly family and foreign owners, reduce both the probability and intensity of paying a 
cash dividend in Turkey. Similarly, the existence of multiple large shareholders (i.e., higher 
ownership concentration) has a negative influence on dividend payment decisions of BIST-
listed firms. This evidence may indicate that large owners can mitigate the free-rider problem 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
35 
 
of monitoring managers. Additionally, the nature of heavily concentrated ownership 
structures lessens the need for paying cash dividends as an internal disciplinary device. 
Finally, our statistical findings show a strong positive effect of profitability, firm age, and size 
on dividend policy. These findings suggest that more profitable, more mature and large-size 
BIST-listed firms are more likely to pay cash dividends. 
Overall, our survey results involving the major factors leading to a no cash dividend 
policy in the emerging market of Turkey appear very similar to those reported in survey 
studies investigating non-dividend-paying firms in developed economies by Baker (1989) in 
the United and Baker et al. (2012) in Canada. Yet, the characteristics of these markets and 
firms operating in such markets differ in many aspects such as adequate disclosure, laws 
and regulations, institutional environment, corporate governance practices and ownership 
structures, political, social, and financial stability.  
Learning that some consistency exists in the findings of non-dividend paying firms 
between developing and emerging economies is meaningful. Without conducting our study, 
this information would not have been known. Hence, our findings are new for Turkey despite 
some being similar to evidence reported in other studies. In short, confirming results across 
different markets and time periods is important because it enables generalizing the findings. 
We call for future studies from other emerging and developing markets to investigate 
non-dividend-paying firms or those firms with irregular patterns of cash dividends using the 
same or similar survey. By doing so, they could identify similarities and differences between 
the views of managers of publicly listed firms across different countries. Such research could 
help corroborate the empirical results and detect whether a universal set of determinants for 
paying no cash dividends exists. Our study can serve as a valuable benchmark for such 
studies. 
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Table 1. Cash Dividends and Net Income Trends between 2009 and 2016 
This table shows the patterns of cash dividends and earnings of our sample of 216 BIST-listed industrial (non-financial and non-utility) firms between 
2009 and 2016. The S&P Capital IQ database is the data source. Column 2 displays the number of sample firms. Column 3 presents the percentage 
of dividend-paying BIST firms. Columns 4 and 5 report the real aggregate cash dividends paid and net earnings (after taxes), which are measured in 
real terms and normalized by the consumer price index (CPI) deflator using 2009 as a base year in order to remove the inflation effect. CPI deflator 
data are taken from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) database. Columns 6 and 7 illustrate average dividends per share and 
earnings per share, respectively. Columns 8 and 9 show the average dividend payout ratio and dividend yield for the sampled BIST firms across each 
year between 2009 and 2016.  
     Year 
Number of 
Firms 
Cash Dividend 
Payers (%) 
Cash 
Dividends 
(million TL) 
Net Earnings 
(million TL) 
Dividends per 
Share (TL) 
Earnings per 
Share (TL) 
Dividend 
Payout Ratio 
(%) 
Dividend Yield 
(%) 
         
2009 192 27.60 24.82 55.43 0.09 0.45 11.30 1.09 
2010 203 35.47 27.99 68.48 0.11 0.09 19.78 1.42 
2011 213 39.44 30.98 73.43 0.18 0.42 16.20 1.72 
2012 216 43.06 35.51 85.36 0.26 0.38 28.61 1.91 
2013 216 42.59 42.29 87.50 0.28 0.37 43.87 2.24 
2014 216 42.13 34.37 96.29 0.22 0.48 21.73 1.76 
2015 216 47.22 64.55 101.37 0.30 0.45 17.53 2.53 
2016 216 45.37 54.84 82.28 0.36 0.30 16.51 2.51 
Mean  211 40.36 39.42 81.27 0.23 0.37 21.94 1.90 
Std. Dev. 8.90   6.27 13.80 15.02 0.09 0.13 10.18 0.51 
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Table 2. Characteristics of Survey Respondents and Non-Respondents for Non-Dividend-Paying BIST-Listed Firms 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the 51 responding and 38 non-responding firms on 10 characteristics and the tests for non-response bias. The 
S&P Capital IQ database was the source for obtaining data on accounting and financial variables, whereas the data on firms’ ownership structures are 
compiled from the annual reports published in the Public Disclosure Platform (KAP) of the BIST and firms’ official websites for each of the two groups for 
year 2016: (1) the number of employees includes both full- and part-time employees of the company; (2) market value equals the share price (year-end) 
multiplied by the common shares outstanding; (3) total assets refer to the sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property, plant and equipment, and other assets; (4) sales represent annual gross sales and other operating revenue 
less discounts, returns and allowances; (5) family ownership is defined as the total percentage of equity interest held by families (including family members, 
family managers. and family-controlled holding companies) owning more than 5% of the company’s equity shares; (6) foreign ownership is the sum of total 
shares owned by foreign corporations and nationals at the 5% ownership disclosure threshold level; (7) ROA is return on assets, which is measured by net 
earnings to total assets; (8) market-to-book ratio is a firm’s market value divided by its book value; (9) debt ratio is calculated as total debt to total assets; and 
(10) current ratio is current assets divided by current liabilities. No significant differences exist between respondent and non-respondent firms on each 
characteristic at any conventional significance level.  
 
Number of 
Employees 
Market 
Value 
(million TL) 
Total 
Assets 
(million TL) 
Sales 
(million TL) 
Family 
Ownership 
(%) 
Foreign 
Ownership 
(%) 
ROA 
(%) 
Market-to-
Book Ratio 
Debt 
Ratio 
Current 
Ratio 
           
Mean            
Total sample  1,110.12 359.07 670.09 590.03 43.49 12.54 0.41 1.55 0.25 1.91 
Non-respondents (n = 38) 1,005.69 365.13 779.14 623.46 41.19 14.69 0.51 1.56 0.22 2.18 
Respondents (n = 51) 1,187.94 354.56 588.83 565.12 45.20 10.94 0.34 1.54 0.28 1.72 
           
Medium            
Total sample  280.00 105.30 256.80 124.70 50.29 0.00 0.35 1.14 0.26 1.27 
Non-respondents (n = 38) 286.00 110.40 191.65 148.10 49.92 0.00 0.49 1.13 0.21 1.36 
Respondents (n = 51) 264.00 94.30 294.00 124.10 50.29 0.00 0.28 1.14 0.27 1.23 
           
Standard deviation            
Total sample  3,398.74 659.30 1,394.75 1,589.37 31.46 28.17 4.30 2.17 0.21 1.99 
Non-respondents (n = 38) 2,628.94 599.39 1,672.20 1,588.81 34.00 31.69 4.70 1.90 0.23 2.49 
Respondents (n = 51) 3,898.95 706.49 1,157.06 1,605.13 29.65 25.43 4.03 2.38 0.19 1.51 
           
t-test for equality of means            
Equality of variances assumed  −0.25 0.07 0.63 0.17 −0.59 0.62 0.18 0.30 −1.41 1.09 
Equality of variances not assumed  −0.26 0.08 0.60 0.18 −0.58 0.60 0.17 0.32 −1.36 1.02 
           
Wilcoxon test  −0.83 0.47 0.30 0.50 −0.48 0.36 0.74 0.52 −1.77 0.42 
           
 
  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PTE
D M
AN
US
CR
IPT
41 
 
Table 3. Level of Importance Attached to 18 Factors Influencing a No Dividend Policy by Managers of BIST-Listed Firms 
This table illustrates the survey responses of managers for 51 non-dividend-paying BIST firms on the importance of 18 factors affecting their dividend 
policy decisions. Responses are based on a five-point importance scale ranging from 0 (none) to 4 (very high). Columns 3 through 7 give the 
percentage of respondents by level of importance. Columns 8 and 9 display the mean and standard deviation for each factor. Column 10 reports the t-
statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean response equals 2 (moderate level of importance). Column 11 lists the rankings of factors from highest to 
lowest based on the means of manager responses of non-dividend-paying BIST firms. Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
    
Level of Importance (%) 
      
          
    None Low Mod High Very High  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
t-test 
 
Rank 
Factor   0 1 2 3 4   
               
              
F1 Availability of cash   0.0 0.0 11.8 47.1 41.2  3.29 0.672 13.75**  1 
F11 Prefer to reinvest cash flows instead of paying dividends   2.0 2.0 9.8 54.9 31.4  3.12 0.816   9.78**  2 
F2 Level of current earnings   0.0 3.9 15.7 47.1 33.3  3.10 0.806   9.73**  3 
F6 Anticipated level of future earnings   0.0 5.9 27.5 45.1 21.6  2.82 0.842   6.99**  4 
F8 Availability of profitable investment opportunities   2.0 5.9 15.7 62.7 13.7  2.80 0.825   6.96**  5 
F4 Cost of raising external funds   5.9 7.8 19.6 49.0 17.6  2.65 1.055   4.38**  6 
F3 Stage in the firm’s life cycle    3.9 9.8 25.5 45.1 15.7  2.59 1.004   4.19**  7 
F10 Concern about maintaining a target capital structure   2.0 9.8 33.3 39.2 15.7  2.57 0.944   4.30**  8 
F5 Anticipated state of the economy   2.0 21.6 52.9 23.5   0.0  1.98 0.735 −0.19  9 
F14 
Contractual constrains such as dividend restrictions in 
debt contracts  
 
21.6 17.6 37.3 19.6   3.9  1.67 1.143 −2.08*  10 
F12 
Characteristics of shareholders such their tax 
circumstances  
 
21.6 21.6 31.4 21.6   3.9  1.65 1.163 −2.17*  11 
F18 Tax disadvantage of dividends over capital gains   23.5 23.5 37.3 7.8   7.8  1.53 1.172 −2.87**  12 
F9 Level of management ownership of the firm’s stock   27.5 19.6 33.3 13.7   5.9  1.51 1.206 −2.90**  13 
F13 
Desire to follow the firm’s historical practice of not 
paying dividends  
 
19.6 37.3 25.5 13.7   3.9  1.45 1.083 −3.62**  14 
F7 Desire to conform to industry dividend practice  17.6 47.1 19.6 11.8   3.9  1.37 1.038 −4.32**  15 
F17 
Desire to avoid using dividends as a signaling device to 
convey information to investors  
 
33.3 33.3 29.4 3.9   0.0  1.04 0.894 −7.68**  16 
F16 
Concern about the ability to maintain an uninterrupted 
record of dividends  
 
35.3 31.4 31.4 2.0   0.0  1.00 0.872 −8.19**  17 
F15 
Prefer to distribute cash using stock repurchases instead 
of dividends  
 
39.2 27.5 29.4 3.9   0.0  0.98 0.927 −7.85**  18 
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Table 4. Reasons for Firms Not Paying Cash Dividends  
This table shows the responses of 51 managers to the most important reasons that they decide 
not to pay dividends. The survey asks managers to select the three most important reasons that 
apply to their firms. Hence, the percentages add to more than 100% due to multiple responses. 
Reasons   
Respondents  
(%) 
   
Low profitability and earnings   74.5 
Need funds for growth and expansion   60.8 
Prefer to limit raising external funds due to costs   45.1 
Small excess cash flows   41.2 
Investor preferences   19.6 
Contractual constrains such as debt covenants  13.7 
Industry practice      5.9 
Prefer to distribute cash using stock repurchases     2.0 
Other: Losses from current and past years, repaying debt 
and/or debt level, instability of financial condition, smaller 
business size, and earlier stages in their life cycle.  
 37.3 
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Table 5. Manager Responses to Statements related to Shareholder Preferences and Various Dividend Explanations  
 
This table reports the responses of managers to 11 statements about the effect of shareholder preferences, signaling, taxes, 
concentration of ownership among insiders, and the high costs of raising external capital on a firm’s decision to pay no dividends. 
Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.  
   
Percentages  
   
Statements  
Yes No 
Don’t 
Know 
      
Panel A. For your firm, do you believe that:      
      
S1 Most of your shareholders prefer a no dividend policy.   60.8 11.8 27.5 
      
S2 Your firm’s shareholders prefer capital gains to dividends.   54.9 15.7 29.4 
      
S3 Your firm is responsive to shareholders’ dividend preferences.  68.6 17.7 13.7 
      
S4 Paying no dividends positively affects the price of your firm’s common stock.  23.5 58.8 17.7 
      
S5 Your firm’s stock price would increase upon announcing a cash dividend.   39.2 41.2 19.6 
      
S6 Paying no dividends serves as a message from management about the future prospects of your 
firm.  
 43.1 41.2 15.7 
      
Panel B. For firms in general, do you believe that the following factors would influence the 
decisions to pay no dividends?  
    
      
S7 The majority of the firm’s owners have high marginal tax rates.  23.5 47.1 29.4 
      
S8 The firm’s ownership is heavily concentrated among insiders such as family managers.  41.2 43.1 15.7 
      
S9 The firm has little need to signal its immediate prospect by dividends.  37.3 39.2 23.5 
      
S10 The firm faces high flotation costs of rising new external capital.   82.4 7.8  9.8 
      
S11 The majority of the owners face high transaction costs of selling their stock.   31.4 33.3 35.3 
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Table 6. Univariate Results  
This table displays the differentiating characteristics of 127 dividend-paying and 89 non-dividend-paying BIST-listed firms between 2009 and 2016. The S&P 
Capital IQ database and annual reports published in the Public Disclosure Platform (KAP) of BIST and firms’ official websites serve as the data sources. 
Total sales represent annual gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances. Total assets refer to the sum of total current 
assets, long-term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property, plant and equipment, and other assets. Market 
value equals the share price (year-end) multiplied by the common shares outstanding. Net earnings represent annual income after all operating and non-
operating income and expenses, reserves, income taxes, minority interest, and extraordinary items. Cash availability is measured as funds from operations 
less capital expenditures. Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets. Market-to-book ratio equals to a firm’s market value divided by its book 
value. Debt ratio is the fraction of total debt to total assets. Firm age is the total number of years since the firm’s incorporation date. Family ownership is the 
total percentage of equity held by families. Foreign ownership is the sum of total shares owned by foreign corporations and nationals at the 5% ownership 
disclosure threshold level. Domestic ownership is to the total percentage of shares held by Turkish corporations and nationals, whereas state ownership 
includes the central government and its wholly-owned enterprises shareholdings at the 5% threshold level. Ownership dispersion is the total percentage of 
shares owned by a large number of small (minority) shareholders who held less than 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares. The real aggregate variables are 
measured in millions and normalized by the consumer price index (CPI) deflator using 2009 as a base year to remove the inflation effect. The CPI deflator 
data are taken from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) database. A standard t-test of equality of mean (without assuming equality of 
variance) is used to determine whether non-dividend-paying and dividend-paying BIST firms differ significantly on each characteristic. For robustness, the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test is also used. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Non-Dividend-Paying 
Firms 
Dividend-Paying  
Firms 
Mean Difference t-test Wilcoxon Test 
Characteristics  Mean (n = 687) Mean (n = 992)  t-statistic  Z-statistic 
Total sales (million TL) 430.82 2,021.39 −1,590.57   −8.95*** −16.61*** 
Total assets (million TL) 475.18 2,267.58 −1,792.40 −10.64*** −17.21*** 
Market value (million TL) 291.15 1,899.77 −1,608.62 −12.28*** −18.44*** 
Net earnings (million TL)   10.90   139.00  −128.10   −9.34*** −17.83*** 
Cash availability (million TL)    1.95     69.28    −67.33   −4.74***   −7.89*** 
Return on assets (%)  −0.44      6.61     −7.05 −13.35*** −16.53*** 
Market-to-book ratio (times)   1.61      1.46       0.15   2.16**   1.77* 
Debt ratio (times)   0.27      0.19       0.08   7.54***     6.15*** 
Firm age (years) 29.52    46.62   −17.10 −7.31***   −6.99*** 
Family ownership (%) 42.90    38.00      4.90   3.20***     3.31*** 
Foreign ownership (%) 12.35   11.94      0.41            0.33   2.47** 
Domestic ownership (%)   5.62   10.33    −4.71  −4.51***  −5.24*** 
State ownership (%)   0.00    1.76    −1.76  −4.75***  −6.67*** 
Ownership dispersion (%) 37.32  33.45      3.87   4.09***    3.97*** 
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics, Pearson’s Correlations, and VIF Values 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the research variables used in the multivariate analysis. The panel dataset 
(unbalanced) includes 216 unique BIST industrial firms with 1,679 firm-year observations between 2009 and 2016. Panel B 
shows the results of Pearson’s correlation matrix, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), and tolerance (1/VIF) values for the 
independent variables. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
Panel A, Descriptive statistics for the research variables 
Variables  DPAY ROA GROW DEBT AGE SIZE FMLY FRGN DMSTC 
Mean  0.406 0.037 1.521 0.223 3.521 5.524 0.400 0.122 0.084 
Median  0.000 0.035 1.171 0.191 3.664 5.354 0.447 0.000 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.491 0.112 1.411 0.209 0.606 1.732 0.309 0.255 0.211 
Minimum  0.000 −1.604 0.252 0.000 0.693 0.445 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 0.585 20.13 1.953 5.170 10.36 0.969 0.995 0.973 
Observations  1,679 1,679 1,679 1,679 1,679 1,679 1,679 1,679 1,679 
Panel B. Pearson’s correlations and VIF values for the explanatory variables 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) VIF 1/VIF 
(1)  ROA 1.000        1.32 0.758 
(2)  GROW −0.146**   1.000       1.10 0.909 
(3)  DEBT  −0.401**   0.037    1.000      1.25 0.800 
(4)  AGE −0.058* −0.040    0.073** 1.000     1.18 0.848 
(5)  SIZE     0.207**      0.133**    0.033   0.328** 1.000    1.28 0.781 
(6)  FMLY    0.015   −0.064*  −0.003 −0.131** −0.108** 1.000   1.91 0.524 
(7)  FRGN    0.051*      0.144**  −0.099**   0.163**   0.216** −0.427** 1.000  1.76 0.568 
(8)  DMSTC 0.019      0.073**    0.067**   0.156**   0.137** −0.448** −0.179** 1.000 1.71 0.585 
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Table 8. Results of the Logit Model Estimates for Dividend Payment Decisions 
This table reports the estimated logit coefficients and marginal effects with the z-statistics in 
parentheses. The pooled model is tested using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions. 
Independent variables are one-year lagged. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: DPAY
i,t
 (0/1) 
 
   
Model 1. 
 
Pooled Logit 
 
 
 
Random Effects Logit 
 
Independent variables 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal Effects 
 
 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
 
Marginal Effects 
 
Financial variables       
ROA
i,t-1
       9.810***  (5.96)   1.196***   (7.40)    7.029***    (4.30)   1.079***   (4.72) 
GROW
i,t-1
 
 
  −0.378**  (−2.15) −0.144**  (−2.20)  −0.322**   (−1.99) −0.152**  (−2.01) 
DEBT
i,t-1
 
 
 −2.119*** (−4.91) −0.511*** (−5.19)  −2.823***  (−3.64) −0.534*** (−3.70) 
AGE
i,t-1
      0.275*      (1.81)   0.046*      (1.83)    0.236*      (1.76)   0.039*      (1.77) 
SIZE
i,t-1
      0.755*** (13.29)   0.177*** (12.67)    1.092***   (8.49)   0.189***   (8.12) 
Ownership variables       
FMLY
i,t-1
    −0.597**  (−2.00) −0.142**   (−2.03)  −0.772**  (−2.10) −0.204**  (−2.14) 
FRGN
i,t-1
  −1.368*** (−3.85) −0.325      (−3.69)***  −1.311*** (−3.63) −0.358*** (−3.38) 
DMSTC
i,t -1
  −0.537     (−0.92) −0.123     (−0.92)  −0.436     (−0.78) −0.136     (−0.78) 
Interaction terms      
FMLY
i,t-1
 x FRGN
i,t-1
  −0.056*** (−3.33) −0.023*** (−3.31)  −0.061*** (−2.67) −0.026*** (−2.63) 
FMLY
i,t-1
 x DMSTC
i,t-1
  −0.046**  (−2.36) −0.020**  (−2.38)  −0.042**  (−2.44) −0.018**  (−2.47) 
FRGN
i,t-1
 x DMSTC
i,t-1
  −0.019*   (−1.73) −0.006*   (−1.73)  −0.025*   (−1.77) −0.009*   (−1.77) 
Control variables       
INDUSTRY  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Constant  −3.408*** (−6.15)   −4.179*** (−5.24)  
Number of 
observations  
1,460 1,460  1,460 1,460 
Wald χ
2
 283.87***   154.10***  
Pseudo R
2
 (%)  34.58%     
 ρ value        0.5983 
 
Likelihood ratio test     219.69***  
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Table 9. Results of Tobit Model Estimates for Dividend Payout Ratio and Dividend Yield 
Panel A presents the results of the pooled and random effects (panel) Tobit estimations on the dividend payout ratio. Panel B 
illustrates the results of the pooled and random effects (panel) Tobit estimations on the dividend yield. The table reports the estimated 
Tobit coefficients and marginal effects, and t/z statistics are in parentheses. The pooled models are tested using White’s corrected 
heteroscedasticity robust regressions. Independent variables are one-year lagged. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. The models are constructed as below: 
Model 2.        DPOUTi,t  =    β0 +  β1ROAi,t-1 + β2GROW i,t-1 + β3DEBTi,t-1 + β4AGEi,t-1 + β5SIZEi,t-1 + β6FMLYi,t-1 + β7FRGNi,t-1 + β8DMSTCi,t-1       
      β9(FMLYi,t-1 x FRGNi,t-1) + β10(FMLYi,t-1 x DMSTCi,t-1) + β11(FRGNi,t-1 x DMSTCi,t-1) + ∑  
𝑁
𝑗=1 βjINDUSTRYj,i,t  +  
      ∑  Tt=1 βtYEARi,t  + u, 
                    
                        0               if   DPOUT
i,t 
 = 0, 
DPOUT
i,t  =    
                       DPOUT
i,t
   if   DPOUT
i,t 
 > 0, 
                          
Model 3.        DYIELDi,t  =  γ0 +  γ1ROAi,t-1 + γ2GROW i,t-1 + γ3DEBTi,t-1 + γ4AGEi,t-1 + γ5SIZEi,t-1 + γ6FMLYi,t-1 + γ7FRGNi,t-1 + γ8DMSTCi,t-1 + 
      γ9(FMLYi,t-1 x FRGNi,t-1) + γ10(FMLYi,t-1 x DMSTCi,t-1) + γ11(FRGNi,t-1 x DMSTCi,t-1) + ∑  
𝑁
𝑗=1 γjINDUSTRYj,i,t  +  
      ∑  𝑇𝑡=1 γtYEARi,t  + ω, 
                     
                        0               if   DYIELD
i,t 
 = 0, 
DYIELD
i,t 
=    
                       DYIELD
i,t
   if   DYIELD
i,t 
 > 0, 
                          
where DPOUT
i,t 
is the dividend payout ratio (dividends per share to earnings per share) (Model 2) and DYIELD
i,t 
is the dividend yield 
(dividends per share to price per share) (Model 3) for firm i at year t between 2009 and 2016. The independent variables have the 
same previous definitions as given in sub-section 6.2 Research Design, Model, and Variables. 
Dependent variable: Panel A. Dividend Payout Ratio (DPOUTi,t )  Panel B. Dividend Yield (DYIELDi,t ) 
Models:  Model 2   Model 3 
 
Pooled Tobit 
 
Random Effects Tobit  Pooled Tobit  Random Effects Tobit 
Independent variables 
Coefficient 
Estimates  
Marginal 
Effects  
 
Coefficient 
Estimates  
Marginal 
Effects  
 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
 
Coefficient 
Estimates  
Marginal 
Effects  
Financial variables             
ROA
i,t-1
   6.277*** 
(4.06) 
1.155***  
(7.51) 
 5.708***  
(5.46) 
0.948***  
(5.58) 
 0.258***  
(5.09) 
1.486***  
(7.87) 
 0.152***  
(6.28) 
0.841***  
(7.13) 
            
GROW
i,t-1
 
 
 −0.223***  
(−2.97) 
−0.139***  
(−2.83) 
 −0.182***  
(−2.90) 
−0.114***  
(−2.76) 
 −0.008***  
(−2.98) 
−0.043***  
(−3.03) 
 −0.007***  
(−2.83) 
−0.035***  
(−2.88) 
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DEBT
i,t-1
 
 
 −2.024***  
(−5.25) 
−0.336***  
(−4.63) 
 −2.337***  
(−4.24) 
−0.379***  
(−4.11) 
 −0.055***  
(−4.39) 
−0.319***  
(−5.35) 
 −0.047***  
(−3.24) 
−0.275*** 
(−3.46) 
            
AGE
i,t-1
   0.261*  
(1.77) 
0.016*  
(1.79) 
 0.254*  
(1.73) 
0.012*  
(1.75) 
 0.024*  
(1.69) 
0.050*  
(1.72) 
 0.037*  
(1.65) 
0.058*  
(1.67) 
            
SIZE
i,t-1
   0.398***  
(9.64) 
0.208***  
(10.91) 
 0.494***  
(7.13) 
0.247***  
(7.45) 
 0.013***  
(10.74) 
0.075***  
(12.99) 
 0.016***  
(7.61) 
0.086***  
(8.96) 
            
Ownership variables             
FMLY
i,t-1
   −0.554** 
(−2.04) 
−0.193** 
(−2.07) 
 −0.618**  
(−2.29) 
−0.217**  
(−2.34) 
 −0.043**  
(−2.27) 
−0.064**  
(−2.45) 
 −0.052**  
(−2.40) 
−0.075**  
(−2.51) 
            
FRGN
i,t-1
 −0.436**  
(−2.36) 
−0.172** 
(−2.31) 
 −0.405**  
(−2.15) 
−0.150**  
(−2.11) 
 −0.027***  
(−3.09) 
−0.014***  
(−2.97) 
 −0.034***  
(−2.76) 
−0.023***  
(−2.69) 
            
DMSTC
i,t -1
 −0.305  
(−0.83) 
−0.101 
(−0.83) 
 −0.281  
(−0.62) 
−0.084  
(−0.62) 
 −0.014  
(−1.41) 
−0.001 
(−1.43) 
 −0.010  
(−1.12) 
−0.001  
(−1.14) 
            
Interaction terms            
FMLY
i,t-1
 x FRGN
i,t-1
 −0.027**  
(−2.07) 
−0.014**  
(−2.08) 
 −0.039**  
(−1.99) 
−0.017**  
(−2.01) 
 −0.003***  
(−3.16) 
−0.007***  
(−3.33) 
 −0.005***  
(−3.00) 
−0.008***  
(−3.14) 
            
FMLY
i,t-1
 x DMSTC
i,t-1
 −0.021*  
(−1.82) 
−0.010*  
(−1.82) 
 −0.019*  
(−1.89) 
−0.009**  
(−1.89) 
 −0.002*** 
(−2.95) 
−0.010***  
(−2.98) 
 −0.003***  
(−2.96) 
−0.011***  
(−2.99) 
            
FRGN
i,t-1
 x DMSTC
i,t-1
 −0.012*  
(−1.70) 
−0.007*  
(−1.71) 
 −0.017*  
(−1.77) 
−0.008* 
(−1.79) 
 −0.001**  
(−2.31) 
−0.003**  
(−2.31) 
 −0.001**  
(−2.33) 
−0.001**  
(−2.33) 
            
Control variables             
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes Yes  
YEAR Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Constant  −2.336***  
(−2.90) 
  −3.077***  
(−4.12) 
  −0.161***  
(−4.78) 
  −0.327***  
(−3.15) 
 
            
Number of observations  1,428 1,428  1,428 1,428  1,460 1,460  1,460 1,460 
F test  12.94***      26.88***     
Pseudo R
2
 (%) 13.23%      11.85%     
Wald χ
2
    138.12***      192.27***  
 ρ value    0.3499      0.5141  
Likelihood ratio test     122.32***      289.00***  
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Why Companies Do Not Pay Cash Dividends: The Turkish Experience 
Highlights 
 Firms pay no dividends due to cash constraints and investment opportunities. 
 Firms do not pay dividends because of poor profitability and earnings.  
 Firms avoid paying dividends due to the cost of raising external funds. 
 Turkish firms consider shareholder preferences when setting dividends policy. 
 Non-dividend-payers do not perceive taxes as a reason not paying dividends.  
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